The politics of gay and transgender visibility and representation at the Eurovision Song Contest, an annual televised popular music festival presented to viewers as a contest between European nations, show that processes of interest to Queer International Relations do not just involve states or even international institutions; national and transnational popular geopolitics over 'LGBT rights' and 'Europeanness' equally constitute the understandings of 'the international' with which Queer IR is concerned. Building 
Eurovision could not have become a site of LGBT politics without the growth of 'a narrative of progression in terms of sexual citizenship linked to European liberalization ' (Cook and Evans, 2014: 9) during the 1990s and 2000s, when certain European states and institutions constructed LGBT inclusivity as both a component of 'European identity' and an object needing protection (Ayoub and Paternotte (ed.), 2014) . Any state 'protector' role (Stiehm 1982) , feminist scholars argue, is inherently 'masculinist', vesting the 'security state' with the 'masculine role of protector' and subordinating 'those protected, paradigmatically women and children', who become more likely to accept the state's 'authoritarian power' and 'aggressive war' as legitimate (Young 2003: 2) . The emergence of LGBT inclusivity as a potential -though still not guaranteed (Browne and Nash, 2014) -national or European value has been said to have its own exclusionary flipside in reconfiguring collective identities around 'sexual democracy' (Fassin, 2010) , 'sexual nationalism' (Fassin, 2011; Bilge, 2012) or 'homonationalism' (Puar, 2007 (Puar, , 2013 .
These terms all suggest simultaneous assimilation of certain expressions of sexual and gender diversity and projection of homophobia on to racialised, excluded others, especially Muslims. A related, geopolitical form of constructing national and European identities around perceived attitudes to sexual and gender diversity, meanwhile, separated 'Eastern Europe' from 'the West' (Kulpa and Mizielińska (ed.), 2011 ). This would turn increasingly towards Russia, responding to Russian state and Church homophobia/biphobia/transphobia on top of conventional security threats perceived in Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatism in Eastern Ukraine (Rivkin-Fish and Hartblay, 2014) .
This latest -but not novel (Bakić-Hayden and Hayden, 1992; Wolff, 1994; Neumann, 1998 under threat where. However, a 'discursive circuit' between the Olympics and Eurovision, produced as both events structurally and representationally converged, exposed a wider field of international competition and spectacle, demonstrating that states and human-rights institutions are not the only international actors to politicise sexuality and gender non-conformity.
Eurovision, already associated with LGBT politics through its transnational fan cultures and its precedents for gay and trans visibility in 1997-8, was particularly well-placed to inspire imaginaries and narratives within this emergent (geo)politics. Research on Eurovision has already explored narratives of national identity, 'Europeanness', gender and sexuality in performances' content and reception (e.g. Bolin, 2006; Heller, 2007; Rehberg, 2007; Baker, 2008; Miazhevich, 2010 Miazhevich, , 2012 Mitrović, 2010; Jones and Subotić, 2011; Pajala, 2012; Sieg, 2013a; Tragaki (ed.), 2013; Johnson, 2014; Jordan, 2014b; Carniel, 2015; Ulbricht, Sircar and Slootmaeckers, 2015) ; its functions for fan communities (e.g. Lemish, 2004; Singleton, Fricker and Moreo, 2007) ; political, financial and cultural structures surrounding its organisation (Badenoch, 2013; Fricker and Gluhovic, 2013; Gluhovic, 2013; Motschenbacher, 2013; Singleton, 2013) ; and how journalistic and viewer discourses have drawn Eurovision into international
LGBT politics (Gluhovic, 2013; Ulbricht, Sircar and Slootmaeckers, 2015) . Eurovision, a popularcultural text/event produced by a non-state international actor, illustrates significant dynamics in international politics that Queer IR acknowledges but does not necessarily centre.
LGBT politics and contemporary European belonging
The 'east'/'west' (increasingly 'Europe'/'Russia') axis discursively constructed around LGBT politics in Europe has depended on the (partial) reconfiguration, since the 1990s, of public narratives of national/European history and values around supposedly-exceptional levels of sexual and gender diversity. Such reconfiguration qualified, without undoing (Peterson, 2013) , what used to appear as nationalism's inherent heterosexism (Peterson, 1999) . However, critics suggested this both masked continuing forms of state oppression and violence against LGBT people in those countries and projected intolerance and discrimination on to excluded 'others' (Puar, 2007 (Puar, , 2011 (Puar, , 2013 Butler, 2008; Haritaworn, 2010; Fassin, 2010; Ahmed, 2011; Jivraj and de Jong, 2011; Lentin and Titley, 2011; Bilge, 2012; ElTayeb, 2012; Aganthangelou, 2013; Kulpa, 2014; Kahlina, 2015) .
Studies from multiple countries thus suggested certain states and institutions constructed images of themselves as protecting (depoliticised forms of) LGBT equality while presenting essentialised representations of certain groups (primarily Muslims and racialised immigrants) or regions (primarily the Middle East and Africa but also eastern Europe and Russia) as homophobic. For instance, in the Netherlands -sometimes seen as 'the paradigmatic site of the Othering of racialized Europeans' (ElTayeb, 2012: 87) -Dutch '"public embrace" of gay rights' was said to have 'become entangled with antiMuslim discourse' (Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens, 2010: 967) in state immigration and education policy ascribing homophobia to ethnic/religious minorities (Jivraj and de Jong, 2011; Bracke, 2012) .
Critiques of Swedish sex-education materials addressing immigrants (Bredström, 2005) and UK government publications on forced marriage (Lenon 2012 ) unfolded similarly. Éric Fassin (2011 identified a 'new sexual politics of national identity' with analogous 'racist and xenophobic implications' in France, and in Germany Jin Haritaworn (2010: 71) 
Muslims" who cannot handle diversity and present an urgent threat to it'. These social, cultural and colonial histories all existed within wider discursive, political and legislative frameworks of 'Europe', meaning this politics of belonging could define 'Europe' as well as individual nations (Lentin and Titley, 2011) . Indeed, critiques of this reworking of national and geopolitical identities informed studies of incidents around Eurovision in 2012 and 2014 (Gluhovic, 2013; Ulbricht, Sircar and Slootmaeckers, 2015) .
Terms describing this reconfiguration ('sexual nationalism'; 'sexual democracy'; 'homonationalism') hint at the redefinition of political communities and the 'imaginative geographies' (Puar, 2007 : 39 citing Gregory, 2004 or 'symbolic geography' (Bakić-Hayden and Hayden, 1992 ) that give them geopolitical meaning. While the 'homonationalism' debate relates primarily to imagining Islam, the Middle East and Africa, Robert Kulpa and Joanna Mizielińska (Kulpa and Mizielińska (ed.), 2011) argued these processes also involved imaginations of central and eastern Europe (CEE), specifically in European-Union-influenced discourse that 'frames CEE as permanently "post-communist", "in transition" […] and, last but not least, homophobic' (Kulpa, 2014: 432) . Although Kevin Moss (2014: 216) questions whether there is evidence of any 'actual negative effect' of these discourses 'on local activists or local queer citizens', Katja Kahlina (2015: 2) still finds the Kulpa-Mizielińska critique and LGBT' equality (a tellingly ill-defined distinction in this context) and national/European identities. Besides performance, this also involved activist strategies, media discourses, and practices of organisers, viewers and fans. Following recent cultural studies research that reframes the study of Eurovision around its position in the 'affective components' of European citizenship and simultaneously in the politics of marginalisation within the European idea (Fricker and Gluhovic, 2013: 12), this paper shows that geopolitical narratives about Europe and Russia being opposite poles with respect to ' LGBT rights' have been constructed not just around one mega-event, the Olympics, but around another, Eurovision. It also suggests that, even when Eurovision itself has accommodated (certain) gay, lesbian and trans representations, wider LGBT-equality discourses surrounding Eurovision often depend on a more abstract 'rainbow' signifier which may have less to do with emancipatory politics, more with a narrative of European exceptionalism regarding modernity and human rights. where certain state governments and European institutions were constructing LGBT equality as a matter of European identity and national pride (Tobin, 2007) . Even before this, however, Eurovision had been adopted as an annual celebration both by dedicated fan communities (transnationally institutionalised in 1984 when a European network of national fan-clubs was founded) where gay men were strongly represented (Lemish, 2004; Singleton, Fricker and Moreo, 2007; Motschenbacher, 2013: 593) , and in wider gay subcultures.
For fans and casual viewers alike, 'Eurovision parties' could provide a focus for socialising and spectatorship in ways gay fans and journalists often compare to the Olympics or World Cup. For instance, the gay British radio/television presenter Scott Mills (British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Eurovision semi-final commentator since 2011), remarked 'Eurovision really is the gay world cup' to the British website Pink News (Watts, 2011) . A similar fan comparison calling Eurovision a 'gay Christmas' (Rehberg, 2007: 60) , or in Israel gay 'Passover' (Lemish, 2004: 51) , likewise imagines a 'gay' replacement for a heteronormative mainstream celebration. Initially, gay fans projected queer meanings on to Eurovision by applying a 'camp reading strategy' to an event devised as mainstream entertainment for viewing in (straight) family homes (Singleton, Fricker and Moreo, 2007: 12) . After 1997-8, however,
LGBT activism, European politics and Eurovision performance would converge so far that, by 2007, Peter Rehberg could call Eurovision 'a rare occasion for simultaneously celebrating both queerness and national identity' (2007: 60, emphasis original).
Eurovision's 'visibility phase' began in 1997, when Iceland's Páll Óskar became Eurovision's first openly gay contestant (Tobin, 2007: 25; Lampropoulos, 2013 ). Óskar's sexually suggestive performance also involved technical production advances, such as an electronic backing-track and large scenery, anticipating the presentation style of most Eurovision performances by the mid-2000s when stage-sizes and production budgets had increased. Dana International's participation and victory for Israel in 1998, performing 'Diva', was even more significant for trans visibility, in Eurovision and (given how rarely trans people were then depicted in mainstream media) more generally in countries broadcasting it.
Contextualising her participation must also, however, account for critiques of Israel's self-promotion as
LGBT-inclusive: Puar (2011:135) , among many critics of so-called Israeli 'pinkwashing', contrasts the marketing of 'Israel's gay decade' in the 1990s with restriction of Palestinians' mobility after the 1993 Oslo Accords. Milija Gluhovic (2013: 202) already asks whether selecting Dana contributed to this strategy. Critical studies of Israeli nationalism's sexual politics, however, have a complex answer, acknowledging her success could be co-opted but also arguing her biographical and musical identity as simultaneously Mizrahi, Arab, Israeli and queer (Swedenburg, 2014) (Solomon, 2003: 151) .
Here, again, evaluating the convergence of LGBT politics and nationhood requires localised attention to a particular case's power relationships (Kahlina 2015) . (Tobin, 2007: 32) . Tatu's international stardom in 2002-3 had owed much to public personas suggesting they were lesbians (Heller, 2007; Miazhevich, 2010: 255-7; Cassiday, 2014: 12-13; Carniel, 2015: 144-6 ). Other notable changes for Eurovision in this period included movement from theatres into arenas, expanding the complexity and cost of lighting and scenography, and introducing a permanent semi-final in 2004 so all participant broadcasters could enter (and their audiences could vote) annually. Coinciding with the 2004 EU expansion, this gave Eurovision a second symbolic eastward enlargement (Baker, 2008: 174) after its initial addition of CEE participants in 1993 -though Yugoslavia, pursuing an 'between East and West' self-representation, had joined in 1961 (Vuletić, 2007: 83) . Šerifović's own sexuality was already speculated about in 2007 (Vänskä, 2007: 66) , though she did not come out as a lesbian until 2013. Her performance has however been interpreted as 'intentionally […] to be read as gay' and part of a strategy to alter European perceptions of Serbia after the post-Yugoslav wars (Mitrović 2010: 174-5) . Šerifović thus gave Eurovision a canonical lesbian performance alongside the gay and trans visibilities embodied by Páll Óskar and Dana International. Strikingly, however, no Eurovision performer/performance has yet provided equivalent representation of bisexual identities or experiences -suggesting 'bisexual erasure' (Yoshino, 2000) operates at Eurovision as elsewhere. International LGBT politics were thus increasingly part of the conceptual space where narratives of European/national identity were being framed.
You may now kiss the groom: the 'organisational phase' of LGBT politics at Eurovision (2008-13)
During the 2000s, Eurovision also transformed into a 'mega-event' (Bolin, 2006: 190; Müller and Steyaert, 2013: 139) , comparable to the international sporting competitions and cultural exhibitions the term usually (Roche, 2000) describes. Mega-events have already been recognised as significant in international politics. Mega-events have been public diplomacy mechanisms for emerging powers such as Brazil, China and South Africa (Cornelissen, 2010; Grix and Lee, 2013: 521) , and for post-socialist cities and states keen to prove themselves sites of global modernity and 'full members' of Europe (Müller and Pickles, 2015: 124) . Meanwhile, the security/surveillance practices that national and municipal authorities determine necessary in cities hosting mega-events have been said to legitimise these persisting after the event and to advertise security technologies globally (Manley and Silk, 2014) . Domestic activists and international NGOs, meanwhile, use intense media attention on mega-events' hosts to demand 'transnational forms of accountability' (Brownell, 2012: 309, emphasis original) over human-rights violations -potentially uncomfortable for events' governing bodies -and may wield constructions of 'human security' in doing so (Amar, 2013: 23-4 (Binnie, 2004: 134) , promoting themselves to gay tourists like cities hosting large Pride events or Gay Games. A complication for hosting-as-promotion, however, is that Eurovision awards hosting rights to the previous year's winning broadcaster, not through bidding; potential host broadcasters must first select an entry that wins the most points from public and expert voters in perhaps more than 40 other states. Wherever the next host city/country is located in symbolic geographies of Europe, broadcasters, city/state authorities and the EBU must integrate it into Eurovision's ongoing cultural text with only one year's notice. LGBT people's status in Eurovision host states. In Serbian cultural politics, Pride and LGBT rights had already become symbols in domestic discourses about Serbia's relationship with European institutions and values (Mikuš, 2011: 835) . RTS's director Aleksandar Tijanić claimed a pro-integration position in stating that hosting Eurovision would 'help Serbia improve its image in the European Union' (Mitrović, 2010: 176) Azerbaijan determinedly integrated Eurovision into an existing, intensive nation-branding strategy (under the slogan 'Land of Fire'). Eurovision 2012, supposedly the largest touristic event then ever organised in Baku (Ismaylov, 2012: 835) , entailed extensive redevelopment of central Baku to build an indoor music/sports arena. Just as in recent Olympic host cities (Boykoff and Fussey, 2014: 258) , this involved compulsory purchase of homes and was protested by residents who felt inadequately compensated (Valiyev, 2014: S47) . This itself exemplified the Eurovision/Olympics convergence, as suggested by one study including Baku 2012 in coverage of mega-events in post-socialist Eurasia (Müller and Pickles, 2015: 122) . However, Gluhovic's study of Baku 2012 (Gluhovic, 2013) (Gluhovic, 2013: 208) . Another participant in the broadcast, the German presenter Anke Engelke (giving Germany's votes live from Hamburg), was also interpreted as drawing attention to Azeri governmental authoritarianism when she said 'Tonight nobody could vote for their own country, but it is good to be able to vote, and it is good to have a choice. Good luck on your journey, Azerbaijan, Europe is watching you!' (Taylor, 2012) LGBT equality.
One well-publicised difference between Malmö and Baku was the attempt to reduce production costs, which had spiralled to £47 million in Baku (Singleton, 2013: 94) . The EBU and the Swedish state broadcaster Sveriges Television (Swedish Television, SVT) thus had practical as well as political reasons for reducing arena size and hospitality events (Jordan, 2014a: 97) LGBT politics and to contestation of the meanings of European security, citizenship and identity.
The Malmö organisers' narrative about openness and equality was serendipitously accentuated by that year's Finnish entry, Krista Siegfrids's 'Marry me'. Siegfrids, who publicly explained her song as a statement against the Finnish parliament's decision not to vote on equal-marriage legislation, said she would end her performance by kissing one of her female backing vocalists (Wyatt, 2013) . Ten years earlier, in 2003, much media anticipation around Tatu's participation had centred around the two Russian women doing exactly that, which they went on not to do. Siegfrids, conversely, did kiss another woman (Wilkinson, 2014; Persson, 2015) . The IOC could be said to have betrayed its own Charter's universalism by not addressing human-rights concerns with Russia (Postlethwaite, 2014: 270) .
However, much Western popular geopolitics around this issue reflected an essentialistic binary between an inherently tolerant West and an inherently homophobic Russia, reducing complex politics of gender and sexuality in any of these countries to a simple national us/them. Narratives of LGBT inclusivity as a national value characterised Olympic advertising in countries including the UK, the USA and Canada to the extent that rainbows appeared in advertising where Olympic tie-in advertising conventions would normally lead viewers to expect national flags. A US yoghurt manufacturer, for instance, photographed its pots with rainbow-coloured rims and the slogan 'Naturally Powering Everyone ' (Chobani, 2014) , and Google displayed a rainbow-coloured logo (Postlethwaite, 2014: 272) . Channel 4, the British broadcaster televising Sochi, reworked its logo in rainbows for the Games' first day and promoted its coverage with a 90-second music video, 'Gay Mountain' (Sweney, 2014) . In a country where Eurovision is often the butt of jokes that perform British distance from Europe by laughing at Eurovision musical kitsch (Fricker, 2013) LGBT equality in Sochi, these texts all suggested, was because Russia did not have it.
In the context of Sochi, the anti-homopropaganda laws and Crimea/Donbass, the geopolitical frame of (Golubock, 2014 ). Russia's deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin, similarly tweeted that Conchita had 'showed supporters of European integration their European future: a bearded girl' (Sindelar, 2014) , and Putin's adviser Vladislav Surkov tweeted that 'If Conchita is a woman, then Ukraine is a country' (Miazhevich, 2015: 2) . None expressed similar outrage at 2014's sexually suggestive but heteronormative Polish entry, a celebration of (as its lyrics stated) 'Slavic girls' who 'know how to use their charming beauty' and who mimed traditional homemaking practices on stage (Kaneva, 2015: 2).
The geopolitics of Europe/Russia was not the sole framework for responding to Conchita. Activist groups like, in Croatia, Zagreb Pride could attach Conchita's image and post-victory quote 'we are unstoppable' to their struggles against the national right wing (Zagreb Pride 2014) -still within a transnational politics of LGBT rights but not aiming primarily at Russia. The international trans group Global Action for Trans* Equality both headlined and ended its 2015 statement on International Day of Action for Trans Depathologization 'we are unstoppable ' (Cabral and Davis 2015) . More personal responses were also heard: trans writers reflected on Conchita's potential both as 'an ambassador for diversity' (Lees, 2014) and as a figure whom transphobic harassment might appropriate (Kennedy, 2014) .
Eurovision voting itself revealed more complexity than a Europe/Russia or West/East divide (Walsh, 2014) . Conchita received an average of 4.4 points from each ex-Soviet state, 6 points from each other exCommunist state and 10.5 points (the maximum being 12) from each other competing country -but public 'televotes' (contributing 50 per cent of a country's overall award) varied far less, with Conchita notably third most popular in Russia's televote. It was instead 'expert juries' of music and media professionals (awarding the other 50 per cent of points) who scored Conchita significantly lower in exSoviet states (Renwick, 2014) .
Even Conchita initially avoided playing fully into a symbolic moral geography of Europe versus Russia. While her Eurovision victory speech addressed 'everyone who believes in a future of peace and freedom; you know who you are -we are unity, and we are unstoppable' (BBC News, 2014), she did not directly oppose herself to the Milonov/Rogozin form of state homophobia that 2014's iteration of the 'new Cold War' geopolitical narrative (Foxall, 2009; Ciută and Klinke, 2010) had mapped out for her.
Her adoption of a 'celebrity ambassador' role later in 2014, visiting the European Parliament in Brussels and the UN headquarters in Vienna, did however link her persona more closely to a wider geopolitics of human rights and democracy. At the European Parliament on 8 October, for instance, her speech referred to 'forces in Europe [which] are forgetting our common history', 'prefer to discriminate [against] minorities' and 'characterise democracy as something painful' (Wurst, 2014a) . Developing her stage persona into an activist role through international institutions apparently required Conchita to sharpen her geopolitical positioning.
Conclusion
Contemporary Eurovision is a nexus of international cultural politics, drawing in music production; music broadcasting; fans' and other viewers' practices of meaning-making and place-making; states' and cities' promotional strategies and security practices; ideologies of national and 'European' belonging; international competition; and the objectives of an international technical organisation (the EBU). These can be turned to multiple, sometimes contradictory, purposes. Eurovision enables states, performers, commentators, journalists and host states/cities to express particular narratives of geopolitical (especially national) identity, with queer-coded signifiers among its building-blocks (Vänskä, 2007; Mitrović, 2010; Jones and Subotić, 2011; Sieg, 2013a; Carniel, 2015; Ulbricht, Sircar and Slootmaeckers, 2015) . It can also be used directly for LGBT advocacy. Acts and performances combining both purposes have made Eurovision a site for positioning a nation and/or 'Europe' at the vanguard of LGBT equality. By 2014 it was thus embedded in the construction of geopolitical Europe/Russia divisions around LGBT rights.
How far did narratives about LGBT equality produced through and around Eurovision exhibit the spatio-temporal hierarchies criticised by Kulpa and Mizielińska, and indeed how far could representing certain nations as havens of LGBT rights through Eurovision tacitly contribute to racist and Islamophobic exclusions in the 'homonational' moment? A transnational-level answer requires nuance: as Fassin (2011: 273) argues, campaigns may be 'co-opted in an imperialist strategy' without being reducible to imperialism only. Dana International, Marija Šerifović, Conchita Wurst and other cases demonstrate that an over-generalised benchmark for evaluating advocacy would not capture the event's complexity.
At both European and national levels, however, constructions of geopolitics and culture did combine into justifications for setting or advocating norms. Ayoub and Paternotte (2014: 6, 15 ) note both a 'core' association between 'the European project ' and 'values […] at the foundation of LGBT rights' in European politics, and exclusions where this association 'intersects with an idea of civilization, positing some individuals and some peoples as less civilized than others'. Since 9/11, this discourse turned primarily against Islam to the extent of closing down possibilities for queer Muslims' own activity and expression (Jivraj and de Jong, 2011; El-Tayeb, 2012) . CEE was the target of semi-analogous discourses (Kulpa and Mizielińska (ed.) , 2011), which in 2008-14 increasingly homed in on Russia. The sharpening emphasis on Russia exemplifies the co-production of exceptionalism and homophobia that Momin Rahman (2014: 280) observes in the context of Muslim homophobia (opponents of 'queer rights' resisting them as 'neocolonialist impositions' and expressing homophobia that Western activists respond to with a sharpened geopoliticisation of inclusivity-versus-homophobia). The rhetoric of 'moral sovereignty' (Wilkinson, 2014) in Russian state homophobia, viewing non-normative sexualities and gender identities as European and US threats to Russian health and strength, suggests a similar process. Its discursive circuit has woven through several iterations of Eurovision, and other mega-events.
All these discursive formations, Judith Butler suggests, rely on an underlying teleology of modernity overcoming tradition; specifically, they inform and justify classificatory practices, inequalities, and state violence through asking 'who has arrived in modernity and who has not?' and answering with 'Europe and its state apparatus [as] the avatar of freedom and modernity' (Butler, 2008: 1-2). They simultaneously relegate Western and European violence to the historic past (Ahmed, 2011: 129; Agathangelou, 2013; Bhambra, 2016) . Rahman (2014: 278) LGBT' or rainbow label, for instance, failed to recognise specific marginalisations affecting bisexual, trans or intersex people (Serano, 2013; Wilkinson and Langlois, 2014: 252) . Eurovision fit this pattern both regarding bisexual erasure and, despite contributions to trans visibility through Dana International and Conchita Wurst, as a space that still exhibited cissexist 'microaggressions' (Nordmarken, 2014) . Malmö 2013's interval act, for instance, may have made 'serious political points
[…] about gender equality' in Sweden (Jordan, 2014a: 98) when Mede sang 'In all our cities, the men don't have titties, but they still stay at home to raise the kids', but the lines still contributed to the erasure of trans men, of whom some were fathers and some did have breasts. More widely, Swedish national narratives about sexual equality also masked serious socio-legal inequalities regarding gender identity:
Sweden's abolition in 2012 of compulsory sterilisation as a requirement for trans people to obtain gender recognition did not come into force until July 2013, two months after Malmö (Amnesty International, 2014: 22) .
Visions of an inclusive Eurovision and an inclusive Europe also revealed troubling silences and erasures about race (Sieg, 2013b) . Iona Szeman (2013: 139) , for instance, argued Eurovision producers had persistently marginalised Roma, a racialised and marginalised group 'across Europe': Eurovision entries might contain signifiers of Roma music without Roma performers, or Roma performers without music marked as Roma, but hardly ever both (Bulgaria's representative Sofi Marinova in 2012 was an exception). When the Romani pop-folk star Azis -whose performance persona was famously gender nonconforming and whose sexuality was ambiguous but undefined (Silverman, 2012: 188-94 ) -joined Bulgaria's Eurovision entry in 2006, he was placed almost unseen behind the main vocalist, the (less famous but ethnically Bulgarian) singer Mariana Popova (Szeman, 2013: 132) . This positioning missed an opportunity to centre a simultaneously non-heteronormative and racialised musician in the Eurovision text so that, to paraphrase Sara Ahmed (2011: 128) , he could have entered as a subject with his own voice.
Eurovision cannot therefore be termed a source of 'European cultural citizenship' (Tobin, 2007: 28) unproblematically. Rather, viewing it as a source of European cultural citizenship requires acknowledging the inequalities of access to citizenship in Europe, both in terms of political, social and economic participation and the nationality-based stratification of residency rights. Juxtaposing the 'militarized spectacle' of EU border enforcement (de Genova, 2013 (de Genova, : 1183 Implying LGBT people's security was guaranteed and valued in the space of 'Europe' and under existential threat in the space of Russia, therefore, would overestimate the meaningfulness of equality achieved in states where 'Europe' is being lauded over Russia on these grounds. Neither, however, must one minimise the dangers posed by state homophobia, biphobia and transphobia to LGBT people in Russia (Soboleva and Bakhmetjev, 2015) . During the results of Eurovision 2015, a period when Russia's entrant Polina Gagarina looked poised to win (after a song calling, controversially for some fans, for global peace -and after Vitaly Milonov had condemned her for hugging Conchita Wurst (Schreck, 2015) ) produced strong reactions on social media against what narratives the Russian state might promote through Eurovision as host in 2016. Ultimately, Sweden rather than Russia won, and anticipation of a Russian victory might have been artificially accelerated by an algorithm used by Eurovision organisers since 2011 to produce what they call 'as exciting as possible' a viewing experience during results (Roxburgh, 2015) . The strength of the reactions, and of booing inside the arena which forced the Austrian presenters to discreetly remonstrate with spectators, depended on too many people's motivations to be legible as evidence of one prevailing factor, be it hierarchical symbolic geopolitics, genuinely-held fear for one's safety visiting or living in Russia, or any other factor such as expressing solidarity with Ukraine (which did not participate in 2015). Viewers could have watched the results through any of these lenses and more. Rather, the responses demonstrated that substantial numbers of people, in the arena and remotely, continued to interpret Eurovision through scripts about the international politics of security, sexuality and gender identity in Europe, as they had in 2014.
Eurovision, like the Olympics, is thus embedded in an international politics of competition and spectacle which Queer IR, and other fields, should take seriously. As significant as judicial and legislative institutions are for the geopolitics of sexual and gender diversity in Europe (Swiebel, 2009; Thomas, 2012; O'Dwyer, 2013; Amnesty International, 2014; Helfer and Voeten, 2014) , they are not the only institutions to consider (Ayoub and Paternotte, 2014) ; as well as theorising the 'EU effect' (O'Dwyer, 2013) , there is just as much to learn, for instance about the production of 'locations of homophobia ' (Rao, 2014) or the clash of claims between 'global security depend[ing] on the freedom of queer sexualities'
and 'queer sexualities [as] a security threat' (Sjoberg, 2015: 451) , from what might be called the 'EBU effect'. The very project of Queer IR is, as framed by Langlois (2015: 2 citing Dunne, Hansen and Wight, 2013: 419) , predicated on the need to continually ask what '"processes, objects, 'things'" we miss using our current lens'. It is not just 'hegemonic states', or even international financial/development institutions, that instrumentalise 'queer visibility' (Lind 2014: 603-4) ; the popular geopolitics of television, music, sport and international competition are just as implicated in the public contestation of human rights, the reconfiguration of Europe-Russia relations, and the contexts that Queer IR invites the rest of the discipline to consider. They demonstrate, simultaneously, how studying these topics elsewhere in International Relations today requires the contributions of Queer IR.
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